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Haiti’s collapse into anarchy and gang violence has exacted a terrible human price. Almost half the Caribbean nation’s population is suffering acute hunger, thousands are homeless and life expectancy at birth has sunk to 63 years. How did a country less than 800 miles from Florida turn into a failed state and what can be done to restore a functioning government?
海地陷入无政府状态和帮派暴力，造成了可怕的人员伤亡。这个加勒比国家近一半的人口正遭受严重饥饿，数千人无家可归，出生时的预期寿命已降至63岁。一个距离佛罗里达州不到800英里的国家是如何变成一个失败的国家的？我们可以做些什么来恢复一个正常运转的政府？
Haiti’s history of crisis is long and complex but the still-unsolved assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021 detonated the latest episode. A caretaker prime minister backed by the international community, Ariel Henry, proved unable to govern and unwilling to hold elections. Tens of thousands of Haitians voted with their feet, emigrating to the US or elsewhere in Latin America. The country’s institutions largely ceased to function. No democratically elected representatives remain. Drug traffickers and arms dealers profited from the chaos.
海地的危机历史漫长而复杂，但2021年总统若弗内尔•莫伊兹(Jovenel Moïse)遇刺身亡一案至今悬而未决，引爆了最新的危机。得到国际社会支持的看守总理阿里尔•亨利(Ariel Henry)无法执政，也不愿举行选举。成千上万的海地人用脚投票，移民到美国或拉丁美洲的其他地方。国家机构基本上停止运作。没有民选代表留下来。毒品贩子和军火商从混乱中获利。
The international community has not ignored Haiti’s plight. The US and the Caribbean grouping Caricom have tried to broker a new government and muster a multinational security force to restore order. The spectre of previous failed foreign interventions in Haiti over the past 30 years — two by the US and two by the UN — complicated their task: few governments want to risk their reputations in the quagmire. Latin American governments have been conspicuous by their absence.
国际社会没有忽视海地的困境。美国和加勒比共同体(Caricom)试图斡旋建立一个新政府，并召集一支多国安全部队来恢复秩序。过去30年里，外界曾对海地进行干预，美国两次，联合国两次，但都以失败告终，这让他们的任务变得更加复杂：很少有政府愿意冒着声誉受损的风险陷入泥潭。拉美各国政府的缺席引人注目。
A glimmer of hope emerged this month, when the US and Caricom secured agreement from Henry to cede power to a seven-member transitional council drawn from politics, civil society and business. The council would appoint an interim government with a mandate to hold elections as soon as practicable. A Kenyan-led security force would provide much-needed support to Haiti’s outnumbered, outgunned and demoralised police. The US pledged $300mn to underwrite the cost.
本月出现了一线希望，美国和加勒比共同体与亨利达成协议，将权力移交给一个由政界、民间社会和商界人士组成的七人过渡委员会。该委员会将任命一个临时政府，授权其在切实可行的情况下尽快举行选举。一支由肯尼亚领导的安全部队将为人手不足、武器不足和士气低落的海地警察提供急需的支持。美国承诺出资3亿美元承担这笔费用。
But as the international discussions on Haiti inched forward, the gangs were creating facts on the ground. This month they seized the opportunity afforded by Henry’s absence in Kenya discussing the security force to unite, break open jails, attack the airport and terrorise the population.
然而，随着有关海地的国际讨论逐渐推进，这些帮派正在采取行动。本月，他们抓住了亨利在肯尼亚讨论团结安全部队的机会，打开监狱，袭击机场并恐吓人民。
The gangs have metastasised in recent years from private militia operating on behalf of political barons to more independent forces harbouring political aspirations. Gang leaders like ex-police officer Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier have exploited Haitians’ revulsion at the venality of the country’s elite to present themselves as alternative leaders.
近年来，这些帮派已经从代表政治大亨的私人民兵转变为怀有政治抱负的更独立的力量。像绰号“烤肉”的前警官吉米•切里泽尔(Jimmy Cherizier)这样的帮派头目利用海地人对国家精英腐败的反感，把自己塑造成替代领导人。
Unsurprisingly, the gangs reject the transition council plan and have threatened those who take part: their interest is in growing their own power and continuing their trade in drugs, arms, kidnapping and extortion.
不出所料，这些帮派拒绝过渡委员会的计划，并威胁那些参与计划的人：他们的兴趣是扩大自己的权力，继续他们的毒品、武器、绑架和勒索交易。
If the transitional council can start work — an uncertain prospect amid death threats against its nominees and constant substitutions of names — and the Kenyan-led security force can be deployed quickly to support it, Haiti has a chance of securing a functioning government. But those are big “ifs”.
如果过渡委员会能够开始工作——这是一个不确定的前景，因为其提名人面临死亡威胁，而且不断有人被替换——并且肯尼亚领导的安全部队能够迅速部署来支持它，海地就有机会确保一个正常运作的政府。但这些都是很大的“如果”。
There are concerns the international police force is not large or strong enough to restore order. There are also worries over the transitional council’s ability to reach consensus and its legitimacy is open to question, since its members are largely drawn from the country’s discredited elite.
有人担心，国际警察部队的规模和力量不足以恢复秩序。人们还担心过渡委员会能否达成共识，其合法性也有待商榷，因为其成员大多来自该国名声不佳的精英阶层。
Yet the reality is that the US-Caricom plan is the only one on the table, with no obvious alternatives. Increasing the muscle of the international security force and deploying it as quickly as possible would give the Haitian-led political process at least a fighting chance. The alternative is Somalia in the Caribbean.
然而，现实情况是，美国-加勒比共同体计划是摆在桌面上的唯一方案，没有明显的替代方案。加强国际安全部队的力量并尽快部署，至少会给海地领导的政治进程带来一线生机。另一个选择是变成加勒比海的索马里。
